CURRIER v. LOCKWOOD.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS-

Supreme Court of Errors of (o unecticut.
CURRIER v. LOCKWOOD.
A writing in these words, " Due C. & B. seventeen dollars, value received.
F. L.," does not import an express promise to pay, but is merely an acknowledgment of* indebtedness, from which the law implies a promise to pay. It is not
therefore a "promissory note not negotiable," within the statute which fixes the
limitation to actions upon obligations of that description. [Two judges dissenting. ]
Where the debtor, after the debt was barred by the statute, said to the creditor,
"I will give you a ton of coal for the note," which offer was not accepted, it
was held that it was a mere offer of compromise, and not such an acknowledgment
as would take the case out of the Statute of Limitations.
Where the debtor at another time said to the creditor, " Have you that note? I
wish to settle it," the creditor replying, " It is in the hands of S. and you can
settle with him," to which the debtor rejoined, "The note is outlawed and good
for nothing, and you can go ahead if you -want to ;" which declarations the court
below held not to be sufficient evidence of a new promise, it was held that the
court committed no error of law in so deciding.

ASSUMPSIT, upon a written instrument described as a note, with
the common counts, brought June 1st 1872.
In the special count the plaintiffs averred " that the defendant,
in and by a certain writing or note, under his hand by him well
executed, dated the 22d day of January 1863, promised the plaintiffs to pay to them for value received the sum of seventeen dollars
and fourtcen cents, as by the said writing or note ready in court
to be shown appears."
Upon the trial the plaintiffs offered in evidence the following
writing:
Bridgeport, Jan. 22d 1863.
"$17.14.
" Due Currier & Barker, seventeen dollars and fourteen cents,
value received.

FRLDERICK LoCKWOOD."

At the time the note was given the plaintiffs were partners
under the name of Currier & Barker.
To this evidence the defendant objected, upon the ground that
tht-re was "afatal variance between the evidence offered and the
special count in the declaration, and the court excluded the same
as evidence to prove the special count, but admitted it to prove an
indebtedness under the common counts.

It was proved that some time within three years before the
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bringing of the suit, Barker, one of the plaintiffs, met the defendant in the street, and reminded him of the note, and that the defendant said, " I will give you a ton of coal for it," and no reply
being made, passed along on his way.
It was further proved that, about the time the suit was brought,
the defendant came into Barker's store 'and said to him, "IRive
you that note ?" or " Where is that note ?" and "I wish to settle
it," or words to that effect, and that Barker told him that the ,ic
was in Mr. Stevenson's hands and he could settle with him, and
that the defendant replied, "The note is outlawed and good for
nothing, and you can go ahead if you want to."
It was further proved that the note was given for clothing purchased of plaintiffs by defendant, which had not been paid for.
The phintiffs claimed, that the writing was a promissory note
not negotiable under the statute, and was not barred until seventeen
years from its date ; also, that the facts proved an acknowledgment
of the debt, and a new promise, which took it out of the Statute of
Limitations. The court ruled adversely to the claims of the plaintiffs, and held that the debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiffs
moved for a new trial.
Thompson, in support of the motion.
1. There is no variance. The writing imports a "promise to
pay " and it is set forth according to its legal effect : S mith v.
Allen, 5 Day 337; Edwards on Bills 131; 1 Am. Lead. Cas.,
5th ed., 383. The acknowledgment of indebtedness implies a
promise to pay, and constitutes it a promissory note: Cummings
v. Freeman, 2 Humph. 143; Marrigan v. Page,4 Id 247; Fleming v. Burge, 6 Ala. 373; Brenzer v. IWightm an, 7 W. & S. 264;
Brewer v. Brewer, 6 Geo. 588; Lowe v. lrphy, 9 Id. 341;
Johnson v. Johnson, Minor (Ala.) 263; Harrow v. Dugan, 6
Dana 341 ; Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn. 383. If the instrument
is a "note not negotiable," it is not barred by the Statute of Limitations, such notes running seventeen years.
2. But if within the statute which limits it to six years, yet it
is taken out of the statute by the acknowledgments of the debt
made by the defendant: Lord v. Harvey, 3 Conn. 372; DeForest
v. Hunt, 8 Id. 184; Austin v. Bostwicek, 9 Id. 501; Lee v. -Wyse,
35 Id. 384.
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Lockwood, contrA.
1. A inote must contain a legal promise for the certain payment
of a certain sum: 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills 23, 24; Story on
Prom. Notes, § 14; Bouvier's Law Dict., Due-Bill, Promissory
Note and . 0. U. An acknowledgment of a debt is not a. promiksory note: 1 Parsons on Notes & Bills 25; Byles on Bills 11,
28; "Smith v. Allen, 5 Day 840; Beeching v. Westbrook, 8 M. &
W. 412; .felanotte v. Teasdale, 13 Id. 216; Bowles v. Lambert,
54 Ill. 237. The note must contain and must express thepromi8e
of the debtor to pay the money: 1 Parsons on Notes & Bills 25.
2. The Statute of Limitations applies. Our courts have never
adopted the expedient which has prevailed to some extent in other
states, of taking cases out of the statute upon some doubtful or
equivocal acknowledgment, but have always held that the party
must have intended to relinquish its protection, or that its provisions
must be applied: Hfart's Appeal.from Probate, 82 Conn. 539.
An admission that the note was unpaid, accompanied by a claim
that it was "outlawed," is not sufficient to remove the bar of the
statute: Sanford v. Clark, 29 Conn. 460. An offer to pay a certain sum in satisfaction of a larger one, will not remove the bar
of the statute, even as it regards the sums actually offered, unless
the offer is accepted when made: Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters- 351 ;
Smith v. -Eastman, 3 Cush. 355; Mtmford v. Freeman, 8 Met.
432; Brush v. Barnard, 8 Johns. 407; Mcellan v. Albee, 5
Shepley 184; 1 Smith Lead. Cas., part 2d, p. 876.
SEYMOUR, C. J.-The first question in this case is whether the
writing sued upon is a promissory note within the meaning of those
words in the Statute of Limitations. The statute is as follows:
"No action shall be brought on any bond or writing obligatory,
contract under seal, or promissory note not negotiable, but within
seventeen years next after an action shall accrue."
Promissory notes not negotiable are by the statute above recited
put upon the footing of specialties in regard'to the period of limitation, and for most other purposes such notes have been regarded
as specialties in Connecticut. The instrument however to which
this distinction has been attached is the simple express promise to
pay money in the stereotyped form familiar to all. The writing
given in evidence in this case is a due-bill and nothing more.
Such acknowledgments of debt are common and pass under the
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name of due-bills. They are informal memoranda, sometimes here
as in England in the form "1. 0. U." They are not the promissory notes which are classed with specialties in the Statute of Limitations. The law implies indeed a promise to pay from such
acknowledgments, but the promise is simply implied and not
express. It is well said by SMITH, J., in Smith v. Allen, 5 Day
337, " Where a writing- contains nothing more than a bare acknowledgment of a debt, it does not in legal construction import
an express promise to pay; but where a writing imports not only
the acknowledgment of a debt but an agreement to pay it, this
amounts to an express contract."
In that case the words " on demand" were held to import and
to be an express promise to pay. That case adopts the correct
principle, namely, that to constitute a promissory note there must
be an express as contradistinguished from an implied promise.
The words "on demand" are here wanting. The words "value
received," which are in the writing signed by the defendant, cannot be regarded as equivalent to the words "on demand." The
case of Smith v. Allen went to the extreme limit in holding the
writing there given to be a promissory note, and we do not feel at
liberty to go further in that direction than the court then went.
The writing then not being a promissory note, th6 plaintiff's
action is barred by the six years clause of the statute, unless revived by a new promise to pay.
The offer of the defendant to give a ton'of coal for the note was
not accepted. It was a mere offer of compromise, and clearly no
acknowledgment to take the case out of the statute.
The other conversation between the parties, recited in the
motion, taken together as one transaction, was held by the Court
of Common Pleas not to be sufficient evidence of a ,ew promise.
The result of the interview was a refusal to pay. The opening of
the conversation on the part of'the defendant would seem to admit
the justice of the plaintiff's demand. The expression of a wish
"to settle the note" would seem to imply that it was justly due:
but the word "settle" is somewhat equivocal, and taking the whole
interview together, we think the Court of Common Pleas made no
mistake in law in deciding as it did.
In this opinion PARK and CARPENTER, JJ., concurred.
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FOSTER, J.-That the paper before us is more correctly described as a due-bill than as a promissory note, is unquestionable.
That it would be regarded among busines men, in the daily transactions of life, as conferring the same rights, and imposing the
same liabilities, as a promissory note, seems to me equally unquestion able. It was so regarded by the parties to it; it was so treated
and so spoken of -whenever it was alluded to. This is manifest
from the record; "The defendant came into the store of said
Barker (one of the plaintiffs), and said to him, ' Have you that
note ?' or, ' Where is that note ?' and that he ' wished to settle it.'
Barker told him 'the note was in Mr. Stevenson's hands, &c.' "
Any writing importing a debt, and an obligation to pay it, especially
if it contains the words "for value received," is, in the popular
judgment, a note. This instrument is clearly of that character.
It was clearly the intent of the parties so to make it, and it is evident that they supposed they had so made it. To hold otherwise
would seem to be contrary to the understanding and intent of the
parties.
But it is claimed that this instrument is not, in law, a promissory note, and that the legislature, in passing the statutes of limitation, could never have intended to put such contracts on a footing with specialties.
Now if we examine the various works on bills of exchange and
promissory notes, we do not find that the learned authors of those
treatises agree upon any exact and precise definition of a promis.
sory note. Chitty, Bayley, Byles, Story and Parsons, howcver,
all agree that no particular words are necessary to make a bill or
note. "It is sufficient if a note amount to an absolute promise to
pay money :" Chitty on Bills 428. Chancellor KENT, following
substantially Mr. Justice BAYLEY, says, " A note is a written
promise, by one person to another, for the payment of money, at a
specified time, and at all events:" 3 Com. 74. Par o1s says,
"A promissory note is, in its simplest form, only a written promise :" 1 Parsons on Notes & Bills 14.
These definitions imply that a note must contain an express
promise to pay. And Mr. Justice STORY says: "But it seems
that, to constitute a good promissory note, there must be an express
promise upon the face of the instrument to pay the money ; for a
mere promise implied by law, founded upon an acknowledged in-
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debtment, will not be sufficient." Story on Prom. Notes 14.
Courts of the highest authority, however, both in England and in
this country, hold otherwise; nor are all the text-writers so to be
understood. "No precise words of contract are necessary in a
promissory note, provided they amount, in legal effect, to a promise
to pay :" Byles on Bills 8. "1It is settled that a note need not
contain the words ' promise to pay,' if there are other words of
equivalent import :" 1 Parsons on Notes & Bills 24. What words
are of" equivalent import," and are sufficient to raise a promise to
pay, has becasioned much discussion. "The distinction between
the cases on this point," says Mr. Justice STORY, in a note on the
section above quoted, "ie extremely nice, not to say sometimes very
unsatisfactory." As long ago as 1795, Chief Justice EYRE, sitting
at Nisi Prius, held an "1I. 0. U. eight guineas," to be merely an
acknowledgement of a debt, and neither a promissory note, nor a
receipt: .Fisherv. Leslie, 1 Esp. 425. In 1800, in the case of
Guy v. -Harris,reported in Chitty on Bills 526, Lord ELDON,
whose authority is certainly not inferior to that of Chief Justice.
EYRE, held a similar paper to be a promissory note, and ruled it.
out when offered in evidence, because it had not a stamp. "I owemy father 4701. Jas. Israel :"-This paper was offered in evidencebefore Lord ELLENBOROUGH, and be said: "I entertain somedoubts whether this paper ought not to have been stamped as a
promissory note, but on the authority of Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Esq.,.
I will receive it in evidence, though unstamped :" Israel v. Israel,
1 (jamp. 499. Childers v. Boulnobs, 8 Dow. & Ry. Nisi Prius
Cas. 8, decided by Chief Justice ABBOTT, is to the same effect. Seealso Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & C. 541; 9 Dow. & Ry. 543; 1
M. & W. 32; s. c. If a time be named for payment, these instruments are differently construed. In Brooks v. Elkins, 2 M.
& W. 74, "I. 0. U. 201., to be paid on the 22d inst.," was held:
to be either a promissory note, or an agreement for the pay-.
ment of- 101 .and upwards, and in either case required a stamp.
"1. 0. U. 851., to be paid May 5th," was held to be a good promissory.note: Waithman v. Elzee, 1 C. & K. 35.
The cases are numerous where an instrument has been held to
be a good note without an express promise to pay. "I do acknowledge myself to be indebted to A. in
I., to be paid on demand.
for value received." On demurrer to the declaration, the court,.
VOL. XXIII.-3
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after solemn argument, held that this was a good note within the
statute : , .orne v. Dutton, 1 Selwyn's Nisi Prius 320. In the
case of Morris v. Lee, the words were, "I promise to be accountable to J. S., or order, for 501., value received by me," and it was
held a good promissory note. The court say they "will take the
word accountable as much as if it had been pay." They also
notice the words value received. FORTESCUE, J., said, "This is a
debt, beitig for value received, and not said on account :' 8 Mod.
3(2; 1 Strnge 629 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 1396; s. c.
Turning to the American cases, we find in our own court the
case of Smith v. Allen, 5 Day 337. This was brought on a paper
in these words: "Due John Allen $94.91, on demand."
The
declaration counted on a promissory note, and alleged a promise
to pay in the usual form, setting out the note in the declaration.
The defendants demurred, and the Superior Court held the declaration sufficient. On writ of error brought, the Court of Errors
sustained the decision.
Here was manifestly no express promise to pay; but the court
held that there was one implied, and so sustained the claim of the
plaintiff. - The difference between this and the case at bar is very
slight. This contains the words "on demand," that at bar the
,words "1value received."
The one by its terms is due on demand,
and the promise to pay is, therefore, implied by law, the other is,
in legal effect, due on demand, and it is difficult to see a good reason why the law does not as readily imply a promise to pay such a
debt, as one due on demand by its own terms. B]ecsides, a valuable consideration is expressed in the case at bar by the words
ccvalue received," while none is expressed in the cise of Smith v.
Allen. Since the case of -Edgerton v. Zdqerton, 8 Conn. 6, and
the case of Bristol v. larner,19 Conn. 7, it is quite clear that,
by the law of this state, a promissory note, not negotiable, and not
purporting on its face to be for value received, does not imply a
consideration. Smith v. Allen, and the case at bar, are alike in
omitting the words "or order," and "or bearer," and so are alike
non-negotinble. Such notes however are regarded as within the
statute of 3 and 4 Anne: Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123.
Passing from this decision in our own court to the court of New
York, where we are accustomed to find questions of mercantile and
commercial law as ably discussed and as intelligently decided as
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in any of our sister states, we find the case of Russell v. Whiptple,
2 Cow. 536. The suit was on this paper, "-Due S., or bearer,
$10." This differs from the case at bar in adding the words
" value received."
The court said it was a promissory note, and
that the case was too plain for argument.
In Kimball v. Hfuntington, 10 Wend. 675, this paper, " Due
R. q325, payable on demand," was held admissible in evidence as
a promissory note. Judge NELSON says: "The acknowledgment
of indebtedness, on its face, implies a promise to pay the plaintiffs, and the payment by its terms is to be money, absolutely, on
demand."
In Luqueer v. Prosser, 1 Hill 259, Judge COW EN says : "If
there be in legal effect an absolute promise that money shall be
paid, all the rest is a dispute about words. * * * The whole
inquiry is, does the paper import an engagement that money shall
be paid, absolutely ? If it do, no matter by what words, it is a
good note."
In Saelkett v. Spencer, 29 Barb. 180, this paper, "Due S. or
bearer, $340, for value received with interest," the court say "1is
a good promissory note, and if it specifies no time of payment, it
is, in legal effect, payable immediately, and without grace."
In Franklinv. March, 6 N. I. 364, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held this paper, " Good to R. C. or order, for $30,
borrowed money," to be a good promissory note.
In addition to the cases above cited, the following are very strong
authorities to sustain the claim that this is a promissory note:
Cummings v. Freenman, 2 Hlumph. 143; Harrow v. Dugan, 6
Dana 341: Flemhg v. Barge, 6 Ala. 373; Jinn, v. Yhirley, 7
Missouri 42 ; M :Gowan v. lMest, Id. 569; Lorne v. Murplhy, 9
eon. 3:38. It Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Ala. 261. the court say:
"The acknowledgment of a debt, due for a valuable consideration,
clearly implies a promise to pay it on request."
The reord discloses the fact that the paper before us was given
for the purchase of clothing, and that the price of it has never
been paid. Our Statute of Limitations bars all right of action
upon it. unless it is recognised as a promissory note. So to recognise it will in my opinion do much less violence to law, than
will be done to justice if we permit this defendant thus to escape
the payment of an honest debt for the necessaries of life.
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I would admit the paper offered in evidence in support of the
first count in the declaration.
In this opinion

PHELPS,

J., concurred.

The law of the preceding case is very
fully presented in the two opinions, and
we are somewhat surprised that there
should have been any hesitation among
the members of the court in declaring the
instrument in question a promissor3 note.
The argument of the learned Chief
Justice that the statute must have been
intended to apply only to "promissory
notes" "in the sterotyped form familiar
to all," is not satisfactory. The words
of the statute are "1promissory notes,"
and that term must have its ordinary constrtction and be applied to all contracts
known in the law by that name, in whatever form. The argument, too, that a
contract to be a promissory note must
contain an express undertaking to pay,
and not merely one implied by law, is
calculated to imply more than it really
means. A promissory note is not required to be in any particular form, much
less to embrace the word "promise."
All that is required is, that the written
terms used, in their proper legal construetion, shall import an admission by
the maker that he holds himself bound to
jay the payee a definite sum of money
at a definite time; or, no time being
named, then presently or on demand.
But some of the decided cases will show,
at once, that words, implied from other
words, are as much a portion of the contract as if written out at length. Thus
in Simpson v. Vautghan, 2 Atkins 32, a
writing in thesewords, " Borrowed of J.
S. 501., which I promise never to pay,"
was heldl a good promissory note, not
upon the import of the very words used,
hut upon the construction put upon the
sense in which the maker must have expected the words to be received and understood by the payee. So also when
the writing was, " For value received of

C. & M., or order, thirty dollars and
eighty-three cents, on demand, and interest annually," the court held it a good
promissory note, not upon the force ot
the terms used, but of those omitted and
supplied by the construction of the court:
Cummings v. Gassett, 19 Vt. 308.
So in the contract in the principal
ease: "1Due C. & B. seventeen dollars,
value received," signed F. L., it is impossible to suppose the parties could have
understood the contract in any other
sense than that the maker acknowledged
himself indebted to the payees in the
sum named, and held himself bound and
ready to pay the same presently or, in
legal phrase, " on demand," that is,
without demand. For when no time of
payment is named in a promissory note
it is precisely the same as if written 11on
demand." This is so held in Aldous v.
Cornwell, L. R. 3 Q. B. 573, where a
note written without naming any time
of payment was subsequently altered by
inserting "on demand," and the court
said it did not alter the legal effect.
And "due" means owing, and when one
executes and delivers a writing to that
effect, the only rational construction of
the transaction is that he expects the
payee to understand that he holds himself thereby bound to pay the sum named.
And this precisely meets Mr. Justice
SToxY's definition of a good promissory
note, 1, an acknowledgment due to A. a
certain sum of money payoble on demand, 1 Story Prom. Note', 12, citing
Pepoon v. Stagg, 1 Nott & McCord 102;
Kimball v. Hantinq:on, 10 Wendell 675.
And the cases are very numerous where
contracts of similar import have been
held good promissory notes. The Cannecticut case, Smith v. Allen, 5 Day 337,
where the following contract, "1Due
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John Allen $94.91 on demand," was
held a good promissory note, seems to us
to govern the present case, and we are
surprised the court did not so regard it.
And in Sackett v. Spencer, 29 Barb. 180,
the words, "Due S., or bearer, $340,
for value received, with interest," are
identical in import with the contract
before the court. And in Carver v.
Haynes, 47 Me. 257, the words, "Due
A. B., or order, $20, on demand," were
held a good note. And in Jacquin v.
Warren, 40 111. 459, "1Due G. S. W. five
hundred and twenty-five dollars," was
held a good promissory note. And in
lussey v. Winslow, 59 Me. 170, the
words "Good to bearer," were held

sufficient obligatory words to constitute
a promissory note. Many similar cases
may e found both in this country and
in England, and there are few looking
in any degree in the opposite direction.
The decisions in England seem to treat
I. 0. U.'s when no time of payment is
named, as not amounting to promissory
notes. But these cases may be regarded
as resting upon peculiar grounds. It is
well understood there to be a form of
contract or symbol passing among gentlemen as evidence of merely honorary
debtq, and to require them to be stamped
would be inconsistent with their character.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
THE STATE OF KANSAS v. LEWIS CRAWFORD.
In a criminal action, where the defence of insanity is set up, it does not devolve
upon the defendant to prove that he is insane by a preponderance of the evidence;
but if, upon the whole of the evidence introduced on the trial, together with all
the legal presumptions applicable to the case under the evidence, there should be a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is sane or insane, he must be acquitted.
The case of .le State of Kansas v. Boyle, 10 Kansas, with regard to the effect
of repeals of statutes, in criminal cases, referred to and followed.

Appeal from Marion county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VALENTINE, J.-This was a criminal action, in which the defenilant was prosecuted for murder in the first degree, found guilty
thereof, and sentenced to be executed. Three principal questions
are raised in the case. First, Was the jury legally impannelled ?
Second, Was the charge of the court with reference to insanity correct ? Third, Was the sentence correct ? The first question is
settled in the case of State v. Afedlicott, 10 Kans. The question
as presented in that case, made a much stronger case for the defendant, than it does as presented in this case. And, as the opinions of the judges of this court, with regard to said question, have
not changed, it is necessary for us now, only to refer to that case.
Second, Did the court charge the jury correctly with regard to
the question of insanity ? The court in substance charged, that
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it devolved upon the defendant to prove that he was insane, and
that he must do so by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
be acquitted. This we think is not the law. We suppose it will
be conceded that no crime can be committed by an insanie person.
Or at least, it will be conceded that no act Nhich is the result of
insanity, total or partial, the result of aninsane delusion, or the result of an insane uncontrollable impulse, can be denominated a
crime. Murder at common law is defined to be, " When a person
of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable
creature in being, and under the King's peace, with malice prepense
or aforethought, either express or implied :" 4 Blackstone Com.
195; 2 Chitty Cr. Law 724; 3 Coke Inst. 47. And our statutes
have nowhere attempted to change the common-law definition of
murder. But they have simply taken murder as defined at c6mmon
law and divided it into two or probably, three degrees: General
Stat. 319, 320, sections 6, 7, 12. The fact then of soundness of
mind is as much an essehtial ingredient of the crime of murder as
the fact of killing or malice, or any other fact or ingredient of
murder, and should, it would seem, be made out in the same way,
by the sa'we party, and by evidence of the same kind and degree,
and as conclusive in its character, as is required in makiiig out any
other essential fact, ingredient or element of murder.
In every criminal action in this state, "A defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. When there is
a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he
must be acquitted. When there is a reasonable doubt in which of
two or more degrees of an offence he is guilty, he may be convicted of the lowest degree only." This is the statute law of
Kansas (Gen. Stat. 856, sec. 228), and we suppose will therefore
not be controverted. This statute in substance is, that every
defendant is presumed to be innocent of all crime until his guilt is
legally shown; that it devolves upon the state to show his guilt;
that his guilt must be shown by evidence that will convince the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and if, upon the whole of the
evidence submitted to the jury, there should be a reasonable doubt
as to whether his guilt is satisfiuctorily shown,'he must be acquitted.
Now as no insane person can commit a crime, it necessarily
follows that if the jury have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
sanity, they must also have a reasonable doubt of his guilt. To
doubt his sanity is to doubt his guilt, and to doubt his guilt (if
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the doubt be a reasonable one) is to acquit. The doubt of guilt
cannot be of a less degree than the doubt of sanity. And if the
doubt of sanity be a reasonable doubt, the doubt of guilt must also
and necessarily be a reasonable doubt.
It has been said that this reasonable doubt goes only to the
corpus delicti, the body of the offence. We scarcely know in
what sense the words corpus delieti are here intended to be used,
bu.t in whatever sense they may be intended to be used, the proposition is probably erroneous. If it be said that the offence itself
with all its essential ingredients (and this, in fact, is what constitutes the body of the offence, the corpus delicti) must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the dvfendant's connection
therewith and his capacity to commit the same may be proved by a
less degree of evidence, then the proposition is glaringly inconsistent and erroneous as applied to a case like the one at bar.
For if the supposed offence be committed by the defendant alone,
then, unless he has capacity to commit an offence, no offence is in
fact committed. And if it devolves upon the defendant to prove
his want of capacity by a preponderance of the evidence, if, in
other words, the state may prove his capacity (where possibly a
vast amount of evidence is introduced by both parties and on each
side of the question) by an equilibrium of the evidence, by less
than a preponderance of the evidence, then it follows, as a logical
necessity, that the offence itself may be proved by less than a preponderance of the evidence. With capacity in the perpetration, a
crime is committed; without capacity no crime is committed; the
capacity is proved by less than a preponderance of the evidence;
therefore, the crime itself is proved by less than a preponderance
of the evidence. The plea of insanity is not in any sense like the
plea of confession and avoidance. The defendant does not say by
his plea of insanity, "It is true I committed murder as charged
in the indictment, but I was insane at the time, and therefore
should not be punished therefor ;" for if he committed murder he
could not have been insane, and if bawas insane he could not have
committed murder. The two things are wholly inconsistent with
each'other. But the defendant does say by the plea, "I am not
guilty of murder at all, nor of any other offence, because I was
insane at the time the supposed offence was committed, and was therefore incapable of committing any offence." Neither is the plea of
insanity an affirmative plea on the part of the defendant. It is
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merely a part of the negative plea of "not guilty." All evidence
of insanity is given under this negative plea of "not guilty."
And it is given merely in rebuttal of* the yrimdfacie case that the
state riust make out of guilt and sanity. The defendant is never
required to prove that he is not guilty by proving that he is insA,,e, but the state must always prove that the defendant is guilty
by jroving that he is sane. It is true that the state is not required
in the first instance to introduce evidence to prove sanity, for the
law presumes primd facie that all persons are sane ; and this presumption of sanity takes the place of evidence and proves sanity
in the first instance. It answers for evidence of sanity on the
part of the state. But, if other evidence is introduced which
tends to shake this presumption, the jury must then consider the
same and its effect upon the main issue of guilty or not guilty.
And if, upon considering the whole of the evidence introduced on
the trial, together with the presumption of sanity, the presumption
of innocence, and all other legal presumptions applicable to the
case under the evidence, there should be a reasonable doubt as to
whether the defendant is sane or insane, he must be acquitted. It
is also true that when it is shown on the trial of a case that the
defendant has committed an act which would be criminal if he
were sane, and no evidence of insanity has been dntroduced, a
primd facie case of crime and guilt has been made out by the
state against the defendant. But the law does not, in such a case,
nor in any case, require that the primd facie case of crime and
guilt so made out by the state shall prevail unless it shall be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. The state nearly
always makes out a primd facie case of crime and guilt before it
closes its evidence in chief and rests its case, but the defendant is
never then bound to rebut this primd facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. Ile is required only to raise a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.. The burden of proof is always upon the
state, and never shifts from the state to the defendant. The
making out a primd facie case against the defendant does not shift
the burden of proof.
With the view that we have taken of this question, considering
it to be governed principally by our own statutes, it makes but
little difference what the common law was upon the subject, or
what sundry courts have supposed it to be; but we would refer
however to the following decisions of courts as sustaining the view
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we have taken. State v. Bartlett, 43 N. I. 224, 228-230; Hoyps
v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 393, 394; Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 224, 228;
Polk.v. State, 19 Ind. 170; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485; People
v. Garbut, 17 Mich. 9, 21-28; People v. Mecaum, 16 N. Y. 58,
64 et seq.; Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall (Ky.) 224, 228; and
in this connection see Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 693 et seq.
We suppose it will be conceded, that it was a rule of the common
law, that it devolved upon the state to prove the guilt of a defendant, in a criminal action, beyond a reasonable doubt. We will
also suppose for the sake of the argument that said rule had some
exceptions, and that proof of insanity was one of them. If so, then
our statutes have re-enacted the rule of the common law without
enacting the exceptions; and by so doing we think the statutes have
unquestionably made the rule general and abolished the exceptions.
Third, Was the sentence correct? The prosecution was commenced under the laws of 1868, while such laws were in full force,
and the sentence was pronounced in accordance with said laws
(Gen. Stat. 861, sec. 258, et seq.), and not in accordance with the
laws of 1872 (page 336, see. 1, et seq.), although the sentence was
not pronounced until after the passage of the laws of 1872. We
perceive no error in this. We know of nothing that will take this
case out of the decision made in the case of The State of Kansas
v. Boyle, 10 Kans. There is nothing in the Act of 1872 that expressly shows that it was intended that such act should have a retrospective operation or that it should apply to proceedings commenced prior to its passage. And if, by giving the act a retrospective operation it would render the act ex post facto unconstitutional and void, as is claimed by the defendant's counsel, we
should hardly piesume, in the absence of any express provision so
declaring, that the legislature intended that the act should have
such an operation : Shepherd v. The People, 25 N. Y. 410, and
cases there cited.
It is not necessary for us to examine the other questions discussed by counsel.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and cause
remanded for a ne* trial and for farther proceedings.
By the distinction taken in the principal case between civil and criminal
law, and the clear statement of the fact
that the defence in homicide goes to every
VOL. XXII--4

element of the crime, much light is
thrown upon a question which has divided the American judiciary. But
there remains another difference to be
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taken ; it is that between a primd facie
case and the burden of proof.
As a general principle in every action,
civil or criminal, the burden of proof is
upon the party affirming, and therefore
in all cases where the defendant denies
tle facts set fbrth in the declaration or
indictmuent, the burden of proof is throughilt on the plaintiff. This is perfectly
consistent with the fact that the establi~imnt by him of a primd fitcie
case, and the defendant's failure to bring
forward any material testimony to the
contrary, will be sufficient to insure a
verdict in the plaintiff's favor. In such
case he has satisfied the burden of proof:
it does not follow that lie has shifted it.
If the defedhnt, after tile production of
such primdfi./cie case, adduces evidence
which leaves the issue in doubt, the jury
will be instructed to find in his favor.
But if, upon the establishment of a
priid facie case, the burden of proof
had shifted, it would evidently have been
necessary that the defendant should
meet and overcome that case by a clear
He
preponderance of the evidence.
would be, when the plaintiff closed, in
the same position as the plaintiff was at
at the beginning of the case, required to
make out his defence to the perfect satisfaction of the jury.
That this is not his position is evident
from the cases. Thus, the unexplained
possession of personal property raises a
presumption of guilt; but when rebutting testimony is offered, the guilt must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
Crawford v. State, 12 Geo. 142. So it
is said that if a reasonable doubt be
thrown upon a prinadfaciecase of guilt,
the party accused is not proved guilty
beyond a reasonable douht: Stie v.
Merrick et al., 19 Maine 398 ; Stile v.
Bennett, 3 Brevard 514; Jones v. Thople,
The making out of a
12 Ill. 259.
priindfacie case never shifts the burden
of proof: Story on Promissory Notes
181 ; 2 Greenleaf 172 ; 6 Cush. 364;

II Mete. 460; 7 Cush. 213; 12 Pick.
177.
Upon a plea in coqfession and avoidance, in a civil suit, the burden is upon
the defendant to establish the facts upon
which he relies forjustification. This is in
accordance with the general rule, as will
be seen by reference to the pleadings.
Thus where the plea is of a release, or a
license, the declaration sets forth a good
cause of action ; the plea acknowleilges
that it once did exist, but affirms some
new matter, such as a release executed
upon good consideration whereby the
cause of action has entirely ceased to
exist ; or that, as in the case of a license,
it co-existed with some other act or omnsion of the plaintiff which takes away the
right of action. This is a rule not only
of logic, but of convenience in practice.
The release or license (if written) is in
the possession of the defendant, and it
is far easier for him in ninety-nine cases
out of a hundred, to prove that it was
given than for the plaintiff to prove the
negative. The burden therefore is properly upon the defendant. It has been
said that in cases where this superior
ability of the defendant does not exist,
the plaintiff must prove the non-existence of such cause of avoidance. Thus
it is said that, in an indictment for selling liquor without a license, the prosecution must produce primd facie evidence
that the defendant was not licensed; for
as the county commissioners keep a
record of licenses, there is no superior
ability on the part of the defendant to
produce the testimony, and the prosecution can prove the negative averment
with facility: Connmonwealth v. Thurlo'.
24 Pick. 374, per SntAw, C. J. ; State

v. Bartlett, 43 N. 11. 224. But we apprehend time true.grbund of such deciions
to be that tll the elements of the offence
charged are part of the Common wellath's
affirmation in the first place. In the instance given, the selling without license
is the gist of the offence, and if the
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prosecution should prove the selling only
and then rest, the defendant might demur
to the evidence, and judgment must be
in his favor, as no offence has been
proved. The prosecution in such case
as in all others, must prove his whole
affirmation, although it include an apparent negative, to wit, the absence of
a license.
. However this may be, the rule in all
cases of denial by defendant of the cause
of action, holds good, that the burden of
proof is throughout on the plaintiff. The
true difference between civil and criminal
suits is to be found, not in the incidence
of the burden, but in the amount of
proof required to satisfy it. In civil
cases the plaintiff will establish his cause
of action by a preponderance of the testimony; in criminal indictments, by a
merciful intendment of the law, the
Commonwealth must prove the offence
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the
former, the defendant must meet the
case against him by evidence which will
leave the minds of the jury at least
in equilibrio; whereas in tle latter it
will suffice if lie throw a reasonable
doubt upon any essential element of the
crime.
This reasoning has been substantially
urged in many homicide cases by counsel, and has appeared in the decision of
the courts. We may perhaps assume
that the point would long ago have been
settled, but for the misleading effect of
the presumptions by which the crime of
murder, in the absence of testimony, is
often made out. While every ingredient of tile offence, such as intent, malice
aforethought, sound mind, &c., must appear to the sati-faction of the jury, yet
a presumption, drawn partly from the
ordinary course of nature, and partly
from the difficulty of proving a negative, is regarded as equivalent to testimony of the presenceof those ingredients
sufficient, in the absence of contrary
evidence, to establish their existence.

Because the mass of mankind is sane,
and because insanity may readily be
shown, therefore it shall be presumed
that the homicide was of sound mind.
So even of malice aforethought, if nothing be shown but the killing, it is presumed by the common law that the blow
was struck with deliberation, and not in
the heat of sudden quarrel. But these
presumptions, confessedly disputable
and standing only in the absence of testimony, are assuredly strained to their
fullest validity if we consider them
equivalent to the testimony of one credible witness. If such testimony be met
by that of another equally worthy of
belief to the prisoner's insanity, surely
the case is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. Yet while under
indictments where an alibiis the defence,
thie
jury is always instructed to give the
accused the benefit of the doubt, they are
generally told, when insanity is pleaded,
that the prisoner must make out his case
to their perfect satisfaction. That this
direction is frequently the turning point
of the case, will be doubted by no lawyer who has examined even the few
cases cited in this note.
We pass now to tlue decisions: The
doctrine laid down in the principal case,
though of late years coming into more
general acceptance with tile
courts, cannot yet be said to have the weight of
atithority in its favor. In 1cNaghten's
Case, 20 C. & F. 200, the fifteen judges
of England, in answer to questions propounded by the House of Lords, declared
that the jurors ought to be tild in all
cases that every man is to le presumed
to le sane, anl to posess a sufficient de.gree of reason to he responsible for his
crimes until the contrary be proved to
their satisfaction : and that to establish
a defence on the ground of insanity it
mu-t Ieclearly proved that," &c. This
isthe undisputed law of England. See
Regina v. Stokes, 3 C. & K. 188, and
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fence." This language has been quoted
with approbation in several cases. In
State v. flting, 21 Miss. 477, "the
jury must believe that insanity exists ; a
reasonable doubt is not sufficient." In
Bonfante v. State, 2 Minn. 123, the
counsel asked for the "reasonable doubt"
rule. The court refusedI and charged
that the defendant must establish his insanity, as sanity was the rule, and the
burden of proof was with him. This
decision was affirmed in the Supreme
Court partly on McN-aghten's Case, and
partly on the Revised Statutes of Minnesota. In Clark v. State, 12 Ohio
495, BIRCHARD, J., charges : " It
is not sufl'cient if the proof shows that
such a state of mind was possible; nor is
it sufficient that it merely shows it to be
probable."
II. But more frequently the language
of the court would imply that a preponderance of testimony in favor of insanity
will be sufficient. Such is the undoubted
law in Massachusetts. In Coinrnonwealtls
v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500, SHtAW; C. J.,
charged that the presumption of sanity
must be rebutted by proof of the contrary satisfactory to the jury. The jury,
after several hours' consultation, returned into Court with the question
1 Must the jury he satisfied beyond a
doubt of the insanity of the prisoner to
entitle him to an acquittal ?" The
Chief Justice repeated his remarks, and
added that if the prepondera nce of the
evidence was in favor of the insanity
of the priioper, the jury would be authorized to find him insane. A verdict
was returned of not guilty by reason
of insanity. The same assertion was
made in C£ostmonwealth v. Eddy, 7 Gray
584, which illustrates what we have ventured to call a misconception of the
burden of proof. "The Commonwealth
Zab. 196, where IlORNBLOWER, C. J.,
lays down the rule that "the proof of must prove all that constitutes murder
insanity at the time of committing the and must therefore prove sanity. But
act ought to be as clear and satisfactory the presumption of law is sanity, and
as the proof of guilt outside of that de- that presumption sustains the burden of

Regina v. Taylor, 3 Cox C. C. 155.
"In cases of insanity," said ROLFE, B.,
"there is one rule never to be departed
from, viz. that the burden of proving
innocence rests on, the party accused.
Every man committing an outrage on
the person or property of another must
in the first instance, be taken to be a
responsible being. Such a presumption
is necessary for the security of mankind.
A man going about the world, dealing
and acting as though he were sane, must
be presumed to be sane till he proves
the contrary." "The question therefore is not whether the prisoner is of
sound mind, but whether he has made
out to the satisfaction of the jury that be
is of unsound mind :" Reg. v. Laeron, 4
Cox C. C. 149.
The question is at once suggested,
must the prisoner establish his insanity
by a preponderance of evidence, or by
such conclusive testimony as to place the
matter beyond a reasonable doubt? The
language of the 'English judges is somewhat ambiguous on this head, but the
language of ROLFE, B., in Regina v.
Stokes, seems to look towards the latter
conclusion. If the jury must, in order
to acquit the prisoner be convinced that
he could not distinguish right from
wrong, they must of course fully believe
in his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.
We may divide the American cases
according to this classification, into those
which hold that the homicide (1) must
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, (2) must show a preponderance
of evidence in favor of his insanity, (3)
must raise a reasonable doubt as to his
a..itv.
I. The strongest case against the pri-. t-,r ik probably State v. Spencer, I
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proof, until rebutted and overcome by
satisfactory evidence to the contrary."
It was then decided that a preponderance of proof of insanity would suffice.
In Cornnonwealth v. York, 9 Aete. 93,
a case which, though not involving the
defence of insanity, is directly in point,
the court below instructed the jury that,
the homicide being shown, all matter
of excuse or extenuation was for the
prisoner to prove, which he might do by
a preponderance of testimony ; and in
case of equilibrium, they should acquit:
held, that such instruction could not he
objected to by the prisoner. WILDE, J.,
dissenting, maintained that guilt must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
and as malice is an essential ingredient
of murder, that must be so established.
In State v. Starling, 6 Jones N. C. 366,
the court say : " He must prove his case
as you would require the proof of any
fact about which parties are at issue."
It is added, in view of the cases similar
to State v. Spencer, that the rule of
reasonable doubt is a presumption in
favor of life never applied for the prisoner's condemnation. This case determines the meaning of the expression in
State v. Brandon, 8 Jones N. C. 465,
where it is said the prisoner must satisfy
the jury of his insanity. So in People
v. Myers, 20 Cal. 518. a preponderance
of proof of insanity was held necessary.
As to idiocy, see Commonwealth v. Heath,
I1 Gray 303.
III. We come now to a class of cases
of which State Y. Crawfordis a type, and
which seem to us recommended by the
strongest consideration both practical and
theoretical ; those namely in which the
Commonwealth, when confronted with
adverse testimony, is required to prove
every element of the crime. In State v.
Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224, the subject is
ably discussed. A system of rules (it
is said) by which the burden is shifted
upon the accused of showing any of the
substantial allegations in the indictment

to be untrue, or in other words of proving a negative, is purely artificial and
formal, and utterly at war with the humane principle which in favorem vittm,
requires the guilt of the prisoner to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt:
see the whole case. In Polk v. State,
19 Ind. 170, it was said by the Supreme
Court (HANNA,

J., dissenting), that if

upon the whole evidence the jury have a
reisonable doubt whether the accused
was sane, they must have a reasonable
doubt whether he purposely and maliciously committed the act, and hence a
reasonable doubt whether he committed
the statutory crime. In Iapps v. People, 31 I1. 385, reversing the decision
below, the court said of the presumptions
of sanity and intent, "These are but
presumptions, and when they are rebutted by proof, &c., or a reasonable doubt
is rased upon the point, that doubt must
avail the prisoner."
OQletree v. State,
28 Ala. N. S. 701, and U. S. v. McClare, 7 Law Rep. N. S. 439, though not
involving the defence of insanity, are
directly to the point. In the former the
court below, instead of taking the testimony together, selected certain evidence,
and instructed the jury that if they believed, &c., the law presumed the act
malicious; and then added that this
presumption might be removed by the
rest of the evidence. A new trial was
granted because the court had broken
down the presumption of innocence, and
shifted the burden of proof. In U. S.
v. McClare, the only proof was of a
blow struck. "The mere fact," say
the court, "of a blow struck does not
make out a crime. In charging a crime,
the government charges a criminal intent, and must prove it. Proving a
blow may in some cases be sufficient
evidence of a criminal intent, but such
intent may be repelled by the circumstances. If on all the evidence the jury
are left in reasonable doubt as to the
intent of the defendant, they cannot
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convijt himt of tile
crime."
In State v.
JIahlr, 2 Ala. 4:3, the court below
charged ii consona neC with the test laid
d(own in Sta e,v. ,'pencer. This was
disapproved of by the Supreme Court,
whose langange, though somewhat amblguott., receive(l a decisive interpretatini in ,,te v. Bringyea, 5 Ala. 241,
%hein Got.DTHtWAITE, J., explained the
charge of the court below, to mean that
i' the jury had a reasonable doubt of

Case. Several other anthoritics to the
same effect arc cited by VALENTIE, J.,
in the pritcipal ea.e, aid in the excellent note in the first volume of Bennett
& Heard's Leading Criminal Cases to
Com. v. MeKie; in which the distinction between a prinanfaeie case and the
burden of proof is clearly indicated :
while the arguments upon which this
class of cases proceeds will be found
perspicuously set forth in the opinion of
sanity, they must acquit ; and so inter- WXrLDE, J., in the leading case of Com.
preted, affirmed it according to Marler's v. YorL, supra.
R. S. II.

Lnited States Circuit Court. District of Kentucky .,
BANK OF KENTUCKY v. ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY.
Where the receipts, or bill of lading, used by an express company, contain limitations upon its responsibility for the transportation of goods or parcels committed
to its charge, unless the consignee elects to pay a higher rate to insure safe delivery, anld this is known to the agent of the owner, who fills up tile bill of lading

at the lower rate of charge, and presents it to the express agent for signature,
this will be suffcient evidence to affect tile owner with notice of the nature of the
limitations upon tile responsibility of the carrier, without inquiry whether such
agent did in fict know the extent of such limitations.
Where ain expre.,,; company accepts a parcel for transportation over its line, with
an exemption from responsibility for loss by fire, and tie same is destroyed by fire,
by the burnin-g of one tf the railway bridges upon tile line, it is not material,
whether such fire occurred through the culpable negligence of the railway compatty, utr not, sinve it' the owner of tile goods knew, at the tiic lie accepted tile
bill of lading, with exemption from responsibility for loss by fire, that the carrier
woull have to pass over the railway, in the course of the transportation, lie catnot hold the carrier responsible for the misconduct of the railway company.

Tits was att action on the case for negligence. There was a verdict
for defendttt, and plaintiff now moved fbr a new trial. The facts are
stated in the opinion.

.L if IH rb n, and Barr, Goodloe &

tlaphtrey , for plaintiff.

Isaftc Chlwell and G. C. Wharton, for the defendant.
BALARD. J.-The facts in the case are substantially as fillows : The
Southetn Express Company and the Adams Express Company are
engaged each in the business of carrying money and other articles
frou (,tie part of the country to another for hire, at the request of any
one who offers such articles to them for carriage. They do not use in
their business any vehicles of their own except such as are required to
transport tile articles intrusted to them, to and from railroad depots. ant
to and frot steamboat landings. They use railroads, steamboats and the
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other public conveyances of the country. These conveyanecs are not
subject to their control, but are governed entirely by the comnpinies and
persons to whom they belong.

The packages intrusted to them are at

all times, while on these public conveyances, in the eare of' one of their
own messengers or agents. These companies arc engaged in carrying
by the railroads, through Louisiana and Mississippi to IHumboldt, Ten .
and thence over the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to Louisville.
Ky., under 9 contract by which they divide the compensation in proportim to the distance the article is transported by the respective colnpanics. Between Humboldt, Tenn., and Louisville, Ky., both companies
employ the same messenger; but this messenger south of the northern
boundary of the state of Tennessee is subject entirely to the orders or'
the Southdrn Express Company, and north of that boundary is subject
entirely to the orders of the Adams Express Company.
These express companies are in the habit of charging one price when
they undertake to insure the safe delivery of the articles intrusted to
them-that is, when they do not modify their ordinary responsibility as
common carriers, and of charging another and lower price when their
responsibility is limited. The Louisiana National Bank was aware of
these regulations, and had in its possession printed blank receipts, or
bills of lading, showing in the body the conditions and exceptions upon
which the companies would undertake to carry at the lower rate, and in
the margin the printed blank for the rate at which they would insure.
Having received a letter from the plaintiff directing the forwarding by
express of the sum of $13,528 15, the bank, by its teller, filled the blanks
in that part of the bill of lading which contained the conditions and
exceptions, and presented it to the Southern Express Company for its
signature and delivered the package of' money addressed to the plaintiff
without stating who was the owner. The bill of' lading was signed and
mdelivered to the teller of the National Bank, and forwarded by him to
the plaintiff ait Louisville. It does not appear that the receipt was read
at the time of its delivery, or that the attention of the officers of the
Louisiana National Bank was called specially to the exceptions contained
in it, but, as before stated, the bank was aware of' these exceptions and
of the stipulations for the lesser rate of' compensation.
This package was carried by the Southern Express Company from
New Orleans to Hurboldt, Tenn., and there delivered to the joint
messenger of the Southern and Adams Express Companies. While it
was in the custody of this messenger between Iumboldt and the northcrn line of the state of Tennessee, the car in which the package was
contained was precipitated through a trestle-work on the line of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad: at or near Budd's creek, and the car
and package were destroyed by fire. This was caused -by the ftllen lovomotive, without any fhult or neglect on the part of the messenger who
had charge of the package.
So much of the receipt as is material to the present controversy is as
follows:
"SOUTHERN

EXPRESS

COII'ANY,

Express Forcarders,
July 26, 1869.
"No. 2 -4$13,528.15.
"Received from the Louisiana National Bank one package. sealed and
said to contain $13,528.15, addressed ' Bank of Kentucky, Louisville,
Kentucky.'
"
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"Upon the special acceptance and agreement that this company is to
forward the samne to its agent nearest or most convenient to destination
only: and there deliver the same to other parties to complete the transaction, such delivery to terminate all liability of this company for such
damage; and also'that this company are not to be liable in any manner,
or to any extent, for any loss or damage * * * of such package or of its
The shipper and
contents * * * occasioned * * * by fire or teain.
owner hereby severally agree that all tei stipulations and'conditions in
this receipt contained shall extend to and inure to the benefit of each
and every company or person, to whom the Southern Express Company
may intrust or deliver the above-described property for transportation,
and shall define and limit the liability therefor of such other company
or person."
Upon these facts the court charged the jury:
First-That the Southern Express Company and the Adams Express
Company are common carriers.
Second-T'hat the Adams Express Company is liable for the loss of
packages delivered to the joint messenger of the two companies at Humboldt, Tenn . although the loss occur south of the southern boundary of
the state of Tennessee.
Third-That if the jury believe the facts above detailed in relation to
the execution of the receipt, then it, thus signed and delivered, constitutes the contract, and all the exceptions in it are a part of the
contract, no matter whether each or all of them were known to the
Louisiana National Bank or not; and the plaintiff is bound by this
contract, whether it expressly authorized the Louisiana National Bank
to make it or not.
Fourth-If the bill of lading contained no exception, it is clear that
the defendant would not be excused because the accident occurred without its fault. It would be the insurer, and therefore accountable. But
the bill of lading, among other exceptions, contained this : "That the
company are not to be liable in any manner, or to any extent, for any
loss or damage * * * of such package or its contents * * * occasioned
•** * by fire."
"Now, if you believe that the package was destroyed by fire, as above
indicated, without any fault or neglect on behalf of the messenger or the
defendant, the defendant has brought itself within the terms of the exception, and it is not liable. It is not material to inquire whether the accident resulted from the want of care, or from the negligence of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and its agents or not, since the uneontrovcrted
testimony shows that the car and train in which the messenger of the
Adams Express Company was transporting the package belonged to the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and were exclusively subject
to its control and orders. A common carrier who has not limited his
responsibility, is undoubtedly responsible for losses, whether occurring
on vehicles controlled by himself exclusively, or belonging to and controlled by others, because he is an insurer for the safe delivery of the
article which he has agreed to carry; but, when he has limited his liability so as to make himself responsible for ordinary care only, and the
shipper, to recover against him, is obliged to aver and prove negligence,
it must be his negligence or the negligence of his agents, and not the
negligence of persons over whom he has no control."
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"If in his employment he uses the vehicles of others over which he
has no control, and uses reasonable care-that is, such care as ordinarily
prudent persons engaged in like business use in selecting the vehicles,
and if the loss arises from a cause against which he has stipulated with
the shipper-he shall not be liable for the same unless it arises from his
want of care, or the want of care of his employees.
" Without, therefore, deciding whether or not the evidence ,dduced in
the ease tends to establish any want of reasonable or ordinary care on
the part of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, I instruct
you that such evidence is irrelevant and incompetent, and that you
.-hould disregard it-that is, give no more effect to it than if it had not
been adduced."
The first and second instructions were not excepted to, but the third
and fourth were. At the trial the plaintiff insisted that it was not
bound by the terms of the receipt, because it was not shown that the
attention of the Louisiana National Bank was called to them at the time,
or that it expressly assented to them, but I am of opinion that there was
no error in this portion of the charge. The Louisiana National Bank
was aware that the receipt contained some exceptions and conditions.
It accepted the receipt without remonstrance or objection, and both
authority and reason demonstrate that the receipt noust under these
circumstances be regarded as constituting the contract of the parties :
Dorr v. IV. J. Steam Navigation Co., 1 Kernan 4S5; Mells v. The
Steam Navigation Co., 4 Selden 375, and 2 Comstock 204; Richard
Grace v. Alvin Adams, &c., 100 Mass. 505; Ifalford v. Adams, 2 Duer
480; York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wallace 107.
It is now everywhere admitted that a common carrier may limit his
responsibility by express contract, and if he may make an express contract with~a shipper of goods, I cannot see why the contract may not be
shown by the same evidence which would establish a contract between
other parties. I cannot see why a writing delivered by a common
carrier to an owner of goods intended by the former to express the terms
and conditions of his contract to carry, and received by the latter as
such, should not constitute the contract between them.
A common carrier, it is true, is bofind to carry all articles within the
line of his business upon the terms and conditions imposed by law, if
the shipper shall so dimand. He has, however, a right to charge in
proportion to the risk assumed by him. It is upon this ground the
authorities hold, that unless his responsibility is mvodified by express
contract, his undertaking to carry is upon the terms and conditions
which are imposed by law. But when he has undertaken to carry at a
less rate than he would have a right to charge. and would charge, if he
undertook to carry only upon the conditions imposed by law. and has.
by his receipt, delivered to the shipper stipulated for a reasonable limitation of his responsibility, and the shipper has accepted the receipt without objection, the latter is as much bound by the contract thus made as.
any other party would be.
The correctness of the propositions contained in the remaining portion of the charge to which exception was taken may, I think, be.
demonstrated in two ways :
First-By the contract between the Bank and the Express companyit was agreed that the company should not be responsible for any loss or
VOL. XXIII.--5
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damage of the package which should be occasioned by fire. The loss of
the package was occasioned by fire; hence the carrier, by the terns of
the contract, is not responsible. It is not pretended that the contract
was violated by using the cars of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Company to transport the messenger and the package, or was violated in
any other respect. It follows, therefore, that, if the company is liable
at all.it is not so by virtue of the contract, but in spite of it.
. The contract, however, does not attempt to exempt, nor could it have
exempted, the Express Company from loss occasioned by the neglect of
itself or.its servants, but when it is sought to charge the company with
iicglect. it must be such neglect as it is responsible for upon the general
principles of law.
Now, upon those principles, no one is responsible for damage occasioned by neglect unless it be the neglect of himself, or his servants or
agents. But the facts stated show that neither the company nor its servant was guilty of any neglect. It follows that the defendant cannot be
charged on this account. Though the defendant used the Louisville
and Nashville Railroad to transport its messenger and the package, the
railroad company was not, in any legal sense, the servant of the defendant. The defendant had no control over the railroad company or
over its servants. The railroad company was no more the servant of the
defendant than it is of any passenger whom it transports. It. was no
more the servant of the defendant than is the hack or cab the servant of
him who hires it to transport him from one part of the city to another.
,Second-All the authorities agree that when a common carrier has,
by special contract, liited his responsibility, "he becomes, with refer-ence to that particular transaction, an ordinary bailee-a priVate carrier
for hire." or. "reduces his responsibilities to those of an ordinary bailee
for hire :" York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wallace 107 ; N. J. Steam
Navigation Co v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Howard 382; Railroad Co. v.
Lockwood, 17 Wallace 357.
I prefer the latter form of stating the proposition, because it is less
-inisleadin-.. I do not think that a common carrier, by entering into a
.contract limiting his responsibility, changes his character. He still remains a coomon carrier, with his iesponsibility limited in respect to the
matter embraced in his contract, to that of an ordinary bailee for hire.
'The authorities are equally clear that an ordinary bailee for hire is
,bound to only ordinary diligence, and responsible only for losses and injuries occasioned by negligence or want of ordinary care. The defendant
-did by special contract limit its responsibility, and neither it, nor its servant. the messenger, is chargeable with any neglect or want of care.
'The loss of the package was occasioned by fire. The contract provides
that the defendant should not be liable for a loss so occasioned, and as
neither the defendant nor defendant's servant was wanting in care, it
follows that it is not responsible for the loss.
Suppose the package had been lawfully intrusted by the Louisiana
National Bank to a private person to be carried for hire, and delivered
to the plaintiff, and it was contemplated by the parties that such person
would transport the package and himself by the railroads, which, it was
contemplated, the defendant would use, and the package had been lost
under the same circumstances that the package delivered to the defendant
was lost, would it for a moment be contended that such private person
would be responsible?
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Suppose again, that a person should deliver to his friend. -who contemplated coming from New Orleans to Louisville by the ordinary modes
of travel, a watch, to be carried and delivered at the latter city. and that
while such private carrier, without reward, was proceeding on his way in
one ot the cars of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, the
car should, by the gross carelessness of those having charge of it, be
thrown from the track, and the watch in charge of the carrier, without
any neglect on his part, destroyed. Is it conceivable that such carrier
would be responsible for the loss? To hold that he would be responsible
would not only violate the plainest principles of law, but would shock
the common sense of mankind, and yet, not only the private carrier for
hire, but the private carrier without reward is responsible for tile loss
of a package intrusted to him, under the circumstances supposed, if the
defendant is responsible for the loss of the package claimed in this
case.
The private carrier for hire is responsible for losses and injuries occasioned by want of ordinary care on his part or on the part of his servants ; and a private carrier without pay is responsible, if' not for want
of ordinary care, certainly for gross neglect. It cannot be m.aintained
with the least show of reason that the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
was any more the servant of the defendant in transporting the package
sued for in this case than it is the servant of the carrier for hire, and
the carrier without hire in the cases supposed, and if these last are not
responsible for the neglect of the servants of the railroad company, it is
impossible to conceive that the defendant is responsible for such neglect.
The counsel for the plaintiff attempt to escape this conclusion by insisting that, though the defendant limited its responsibility, it still remains a common carrier, and that such carrier is responsible not only
for ank want of negligence of himselfand his servants, but for the
negligence of any agency which he may employ in his business.
This proposition is misleading. It is not strictly correct to say that a
common carrier is responsible for the negligence of any agency in .his
business, or even for his own negligence or that of his servants, in the
sense in which his responsibility is distinguished from the responsibility
of another person. A common carrier is bound to deliver goods intrusted to him, unless prevented by the owner, the act of God. or the
public enemy. He is, as the law terms him, an insurer for the safb
carriage and delivery of goods, subject only to the exceptions above
mentioned. If he does not deliver goods intrusted to him. he is responsible, not because the goods were lost by his neglect, or the neglect
of a servant, or by the neglect of some agency which lie employed, but
because he insured their delivery. His responsibility is wholly independent of the neglect of any one. If goods delivered to him to be
carried are lost while in his or his servants' custody, or while in the
custody of some other person who is not his servant, lie is equally
responsible, not because he is liable upon any princi'ple of law for the
negligence of any person who is not his servant, but because lie is bound
by law to carry and deliver safe all goods delivered to him unless prevented as before stated by the owner, the act of God, or the public
enemy. If he has limited his responsibility by special contract, and the
loss has been occasioned by the cause excepted in the contract, then the
owner in order to charge him must show that though the loss arose
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directly from the cause excepted, that cause itself was occasioned by
the neglect of the carrier. But, when a public or private carrier iz
sought to be charged with a loss occasioned by his neglect, when neglect
is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, I am not aware that he is
liable for any negligence, except upon the same principles, and under
the same circumstances, that any other person is liable. I am not
aware that le, more than any one else, can be made responsible for the
ndgligeuce of persons who are not his servants.
Undoubtedly the defendant did, notwithstanding its contract, continue
to be a common carrier, but its responsibility was limited to that of an
ordinary bailee for hire. Now, an ordinary bailee for hire is responsible
for only ordinary care, and liable for the neglect of himself or his own
servants, and not for the neglect of persons over whom he has no control. Consequently he is not responsible for a loss occurring under the
circumstamces presented in this case. It it be admitted that the common
carrier has by his contract limited his responsibility to that of an
ordinary bailec for hire, then it cannot be consistently insisted upon that
he shall be held liable as a common carrier who has made no express
oontract. To admit the contract, and to deny any effect to it, is too
much for one proposition. The proposition of counsel, reduced to its
essence, is simply this: that though the defendant has. by special contract, limited its responsibility to that of a private bailee for hire, it is
still responsible as a common carrier. A proposition involving so obvious
exposure.
a contradiction cannot require further
But obvious as the fillacy and error contained in the counsel's
proposition appear to me, the proposition itself seems to be supported by
the decision of the Supreme Court of California in the case of -Hooper
v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 27 California 11; by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in the case of Christenson et al. v. American Express Company, 15 Minnesota Reports 270 ; and by the learned editor of the
American Law Register, in his note to the former case (Law Register,
November 1865, p. 30).
In the first case the carrier made a contract stipulating that he would
not be responsible except as forwarder. The court construed the contract as limiting the responsibility of the carrier to that of a forwarder
-that is, ot"an ordinary bailee for hire-but they held the carriers
responsible for a loss occurring on a tug or lighter which plied between
the shore and an ocean steamer, occasioned by the negligence of the
managers of the tug, although they were not subject to the control or
orders of the express company.
In respect to the responsibility of forwarders, the court say: "They
are not insurers like carriers, but they are liable for losses of goods
while in their custody, resulting from negligence of themselves, and
those they employ in their business of forwarders."
The correctness of the first part of this proposition cannot be disputed, nor do I question the correctness of the latter part, if by "those
whom they employ in their business of forwarders" the court mean
those who are the forwarders' servants, and subject to their control and
orders. The court further say, the responsibility of a forwarder is the
same as that of a warehouse-man, and '"if a warehouse man, instead of
using his own warehouse, and employing his own subordinates, should,
for a stipulated sum, paid to the owner, use in his business the ware-
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house of another person, who employs and controls the subordinates,
there can be no doubt that lie would be liable for a loss of the goods
intrusted to his care, occurring while in his possession, and resulting
from the negligence of such subordinates, although not under his
control."
If by the words " intrusted to his care," the court mean to suggest a
case where the warehouseman has a contract to keep the goods in his
own warehouse, I entirely concur in the proposition stated. But, if
they mean that a warehouseman, who violates no contract by removing
the goods of his customer from his own warehouse into that of another
prudent warehouseman, is responsible for a loss of the goods resulting
from the negligence of the subordinates of such other warehouseman, I
cannot assent to it.
Suppose a warehouseman's warehouse should be destroyed by fire, it
would be his duty to remove such of the goods of his customiers as were
saved to the warehouse of some other prudent person, and it cannot be
insisted that he would be responsible for the loss of goods occurring
there, resulting from the negligence of servants of the latter warehouseman.
If a warehouseman contract to keep goods in his own warehouse, and
he should remove them-in violation of his contract-to another warehouse, I suppose he would be liable for all losses there occurring, just as
a bailee who hires a horse to go to a particular place is responsible for
loss or injury to the horse, should he drive or ride him to a different
place, and the horse be lost or injured in the prosecution of such other
journey.
Again, thb court say: "The fact that the defendants made use of
various public conveyances, their messenger with the treasure travelling
a part of the way by stage. a part by steam-tug and lighters, and a part
by ocean steamer, makes no difference as to their liability. For defendants' purposes, the managers of these various conveyances were their
agents and employees."
If. as seems to be conceded, it was contemplated by both the plaintiff
and defendants that the defendants would not use in their business their
own vehicles, but the conveyances of others, not at all subject to their
control or management, and that in thd use of those other conveyances
the defendants did not violate their contract, I cannot admit that the
defendants, who, by the admissions of the court, were liable only as ordinary bailees for hire, were responsible for losses occasioned by the negligeice of the managers of those conveyances. I cannot admit that the
managers of those other conveyances were, in any legal sense, 'their
agents and employees. The relation of master and servant, principal
and agent, does not and cannot exist where the master has no control
over the servant, and the principal no control over the agent.
The court further say: "The defendants had the means of holding
the proprietors of those various vehicles used in their business of expressmen responsible to them, had they chosen to do so. If they did
not take the proper means to secure themselves, it was their own fault."
But I cannot see how any argument can be drawn from this to show
that the defendants were responsible. Every bailee or depositary may
hold any one responsible for destroying or injuring goods in his possession, but it cannot be maintained that lie is responsible for such destrue-
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tion or injury unless he by his negligence contribute to the same. Besides, the plaintiff had his remedy against the proprietors of those other
conveyances, which occasioned the loss [see the A. J. Steam Niviyatiou
0o. v. .Aferchants' Bank, 6 Howard 382], and it might be retorted - that
if he did not take the proper means to secure himself, it was his own
fault."
In the Minnesota case it was stipulated that the carrier "was not to
be held liable for any loss or damage, except as forwarders only, or lbr
any loss occasioned by the perils of navigation and transportation."
The goods were received at New York, and were to be delivered to
Christinson & Brother, Mankato, Minnesota. When the goods reached
St. Paul, they were placed by the carrier on board the steamboat
"Julia," a boat belonging to the Northwestern Union Pacific Company,
and managed entirely by its officers and servants, to be transported to
Mankato. The goods remained in charge of[ the carrier's messenger.
The boat at the time of the accident was strong and in good condition.
The carrier was guilty of no want of care in selecting the "Julia" to
transport the goods; but on the way the "Julia" was, through the carelessness of its officers and managers, run against a snag and sunk,
whereby the goods were damaged.
The court say that the carrier is not exempt from the loss by reason
of the stipulation in its bill of lading that "it was not to be held liable
for any loss or damage except as forwarders," because, they say: "In
our opinion * * the effect claimed for this clause of the receipt by
the defendants is inconsistent with and repugnant to the scope and intent of the result, viewed as a whole, and in connection with the fact
showing the defendants' real character and mode of doing business."
In other words, the court held that the defendants were commo 1
carriers, and that this clause of their receipt did not modify their liability at all. If the court was correct in this, it is indisputable that this
clause did not exempt the carrier from responsibility fbr the loss claimed.
In respect to the other exceptions, "perils of navigation and transportation," the court says: "The exception does not excuse the carrier
for negligently running into perils of the kind mentioned. The proper
construction (of such words) is analogous to that which is put upon the
words ' perils of the sea' in bills of lading. While thus it would seem
very proper to hold that a snag in one of our Western rivers is a peril
of navigation, as appears to have been done in Tennessee, if a vessel is
wrecked upon one through the negligence of the carrier, or of those
whom he employs * * * the carrier .is not absolved. Under such
circumstances the loss is properly attributed to the agency of man, not
to a peril of navigation."
Here again we have the same fallacies and misleading propositions
which have been exposed in a former part of this opinion. The sinking
of a boat by running on a snag in one of our Western rivers is undoubtedly a -' peril of navigation." It is none the less a peril of navigation,
though it occur by the fault of the person navigating the boat. It is
wholly misleading to say that it is a peril of navigation when it results
from accident and without fault, and that it is not a peril of navigation
when it results from negligence. When goods are lost by reason of
such peril, occasioned by the negligence of the carrier, the carrier is
responsible, not because the goods were not lost by an excepted peril,
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but because he haa brought akout the peril through his own carelessness
or negligence. ie is made responsible fbr his negligence, not because
lie is a common carrier, but because he is gulty, of negligenee, and has
occasioned loss thereby.
In the books which treat of common carriers, only those carriers are
treated of who use their own conveyances; hence it is we often find it
stated that the exception, "petils of the sea," or "perils of the river."
included in the carrier's bill of lading, does not include losses arising
from what would be generally understood to be "perils of' th sea."
when occasioned by the negligence of the servants of the carrier. In
such case, the carrier being the owner of the vessel in which the goods
are carried, and being responsible for its careful navigation, it is not
material in effect whether it is held that a loss arising from an excepted
peril, brought about by his negligence, is not a peril of navigation within
the meaning of the bill of lading, or that the carrier is responsible fbr
a loss occasioned by the negligence of his servants ; but it is better and
more correct to place the liability in such case on the latter ground,
because to place it on the former is misleading.
Certainly, as the court say: "The exception does not excuse the
carrier for negligently running into perils, * * * nor shall lie be heard
to set up his own negligence to excuse him from responsibility." But,
in the case before the court, no negligence was imputed to the carrier.
He did not attempt to set up his own negligence to excuse himself fron
responsibility. He set up that by the contract he was not to be liable
for losses arising from the perils of navigation, and he showed that the
loss did arise from a peril of navigation, without any fhult on his part.
He was not responsible for the negligence of the managers of the boat,
as I have before shown, because he had no control or authority over
them, and as he could be held responsible in the case only for negligence, it would seem he was not liable at all. I think that the court
was misled by the definition of " perils of navigation" which it found
in the books.
Clearly, that is none the less a "peril of navigation" or a "peril of
the sea" because it is attributable to the agency of man. The very case
which is generally used to define and explain what is a "peril of the
sea" is that of a collision brought about by negligence. If a carrier's
vessel should collide on the sea with another vessel, through the fault
wholly of the latter, it is everywhere admitted that he would not be
responsibl forla loss arising from such collision of goods which he
was carrying under a bill of lading that exempted him from responsibility for loss arising from "perils of navigation" or " perils of the sea,"
and yet, undoubtedly, the collision in such case is attributable to the
agency-nay, to the negligence-of man.
I have a profound respect for the opinions of the learned courts, which
I have here noticed, but I think that they are opposed to the general
current of authorities-that they are founded on fllacious and misleading propositions, and that they disregard the well-settled principles of
law.
The motion for a new trial is overruled.
The foregoing case involves two ques- applicable to Express Companies. 1.
tios of great importance in the law How far, and in what mode, such com.
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panics may restrict their general responsibility by way of special contract or
notice. 2. flow far such companies are
to be held responsible for the conduct
of the agencies employed in the'transportation.
As to the first question, it seems to be
now well settled, that since the parties
arc not in equal positions, as to the contract of transportation, the owner of the
goods being, by stress of circumstances,
virtually compelled to assent to the terms
demanded by the express agency, it
is not competent for such agency to impose any unreasonable terms or conditions upon the contract of transportation.
This rule is established in England, as
is well known, by statute, the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act of 1854, J 7, 17
and 18 Viet. c. 31, whereby it is required that any condition limiting the
responsibility of the carrier shall be embraced in a written contract, signed by
the consignor or his agent, and shall be
reasonable, in the opinion of the judge,
before whom any question may arise in regard to it, or it shall not be binding upon
the owner of the goods. This statute has
been regarded generally, as only defining, with more particularity of detail,
what was the law before, upon general
principles of equity and justice. This
is so declared in the very late case of
'ew York Central Ry. v. Lockwood, 17
Wallace 357, where it was held, that
railway companies cannot demand of
those for whom they carry goods, as
common carriers, any unjust or unrea-

sonable exemption from responsibility,
and that a contract, exempting the carrier fromn responsibility for the consequIeuces of the negligence of his servants
an employees, is of that character and
camnt be enforced. In contracts of
this character, too, the carrier must assume the burden of showing the assent
of the owner of the goods to the terms
whereby lie claims exemption from his
ordinary responsibility. And where the
consignor is only informed of the limi-

tations of the coptract, by written or
printed endorsements upon the receipt or
bill of lading, presented to him, for the
first time, when he delivers the goods ;
and he accepts the same with or without
signing a counterpart, and has no opportunity for reading the printed endorsement upon the bill, and does not in
fact read it, or become aware of its import, it has commonly been held, with
great propriety, that such limitations
are not binding upon him : Blossom v.
Dodd's Express, 43 N. Y. 264 ; s. c., 2
Redf. Am. Ry. Cases 86; Rawson v.
Railway, 48 N. Y. 212. But whese
there is reasonable opportunity to read
the conditions upon the bill, it is the
duty of the consignor to do so, and if he
omit to do so, without some reasonable
excuse, he' will, nevertheless, be bound
by them, if reasonable: Grace v. Adams,
100 Mass. 505. But see Am. Express Co.
v. Schier, 55 111. 140; Adams Express
Co. v. Haynes, 42111. 89. The question is
somewhat discussed in 2 Redf. Am. Ry.
Cases 223, 227. But where, as in the
present case, the plaintiff, or hisagent for
forwarding the goods, is aware that the
carrier makes a distinction in the price
of transportation, whether he assumes
the full responsibility of insuring a safe
delivery, or only that of a limited charaeter, and that these two degrees of
responsibility are defined upon the bill
of lading, the consignor having the option between them, it is, unquestionably, his duty to star which alternative he will adopt, and if he fills up the
bill or allows it to be filled, upon the
lower scale of responsibility, he must be
considered, as having elected to send his
goods upon the terms therein specified,
and if he failed to read, or become acquainted with those terms, it was his own
fault, and he cannot complain, if the
court assume that he did know the terms
of the contract.
But as to the view taken by the court in
the principal case, in regard to the other
question involved, there seems to us
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more ground of dissent. This view of* the latter. And the same holds trne
the court is certainly presented witt h of any private carrier, without pay.
great force and argued with great plau. He is not, of course, expected to assume
sibility ; but we must say that neitheir any responsibility except 4or his own
the arguments or the conclusion seem tco good faith and fair conduct. And the
us quite satisfactory. We feel soe
responsibility of a private carrier for
hesitation, in undertaking to point out pay, depends, altogether upon the nature
what seem to us, the fallacies involved in of the employment. If lie is paid by
the argument, or the illustrations ; forr way of per diem allowance, or salary, in
we understand that we are attempting tc any form, and for his disbursements, he
deal with one, who is no common mas- - would not, of course, be responsible for
ter of the art of logical deduction, and the conduct of any of the agencies emspecially with one who feels entirely ployed by him in the transportation, not
sure of the impregnable nature of his even the servants, provided he exercised
position. The learned judge complains, a proper discretion in their selection, for
that the cases in the opposite direction, the reason, that upon the employment
and the arguments by which they are of such agencies, they would become the
supported, embracing, we suppose, our agencies of his principal, and the servants
own humble effort toward that end, to would become the servants of the prinwhich he refers, so respectfully, are cipal, notwithstanding he might have
all of a "misleading" character. That the sole control of their conduct. Under
may be so, if the contention is founded such an employment the carrier would
in error; for nothing is more common, only he responsible for what by the
than for one in error, to use misleading terms of the contract, he was bound to
arguments in its support, for the best of supply, that is his own conduct alone;
all reasons, that he has himself first as that was all he was paid for, by the
been misled by such arguments, and terms of the contract.
But a private carrier may assume, if
adopted the error, under the delusion
thus produced. And the learned judge he so elect, the responsibility of the enwill excuse our frankness, in suggest- tire transportation, from the time he aeing, that he seems, himself, to us, to cepts it till its delivery at its destination,
have been led to his conclusion some- and covenant against all risks the same
what in the same way. His use of the as a common carrier. And if he asillustration of the private carrier or the sumes the entire transportation for a
private person being intrusted with the round sum, he thereby assumes the recustody of this package to carry to Louis- sponsibility for all the agencies, employed
ville, and the apparently clear conviction in the transportation, according to the nawhich lie so exultantly seems to reach, ture of his own responsibility, that is that
that no one would have the boldness to of an ordinary bailec, when lie coveclaim any responsibility on the part of nants against no particular or general
either, for the conduct of the public risks. The agencies employed in the
agencies employed in the transporta- transportation are his agencies, employed
tion, is not calculated to afford much and paid by him, and if the goods are
support to the view of the question taken lost, or suffer damages, through the want
by the court. The sending of the pack- of ordinary care on the part of any of
age by a private person, as is sometimes the agencies employed in the transportadone, has no such analogy to carriage tion, he is responsible under his contract
by express companies, as to afford any for the entire transportation. So that
light in regard to the responsibility of this illustration does not make for the
VOL. XXIII.-6
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defendants, in the principal case, but
rather the contrary. And there is no
such analogy between a carrier and a
wharfinger or warehousemen, or a forwarder, as to afford any light by the
comparison. Express companies have,
s imtcimes, claimed to be merely forwarlers, even upon their own lines.
But the courts have never listened to
this latter claim. It would be an inversion and perversion of the entire
nature of the business.
Beyond their own line, they are, as we
have said, to all intents, mere forwarders,
and only responsible for safe delivery to
the next express company. 2 Railw. 27.
But upon their own line the contract
of an express carrier is to transport, for
a stated price, either prepaid or not, as
the parties agree, from the place of acceptance to the place of delivery, or to
the next express carrier beyond their
.own line. There is nothing in the nature of the business, or the implications
growing out of the manner of its conduct,
which leads, in any sense, to the conclusion, attempted to be maintained in
the principal case, that any of the agencies employed in the transportation are
at the risk of the owner of the goods.
The express carrier hires a car or compartment therein, or he builds and owns
it, it is not material which, for in either
case it becomes his own, for the time.
He contracts with the railway, or steamboat company, to transport his car, or
crate, as the case may be, for a round
sum, by the trip, or by the year, and in
all cases, we presume, stipulates to
exempt the company from all responsibility for the transportation, as did Harnden, the founder of this mode of transportation. in the New .Jersey Steam Azrav.
Co. v. .iferchaits'Batik, 6 Howard U.
S. 344 ; s. c. 2 Redf. Am. Ry. Cases,
34. "The crate with its contents to be
at all times exclusively at the risk of
said Harnden;" and he was bound by this
contract to so notify his employees,

which would scarcely be important now,
the custom has become so universal in
this class of contracts, to embrace such
a stipulation. The agency thus becomes
as completely that of the express carrier
for the transportation of his own parcels,
or freight, which he has assumed to carry
for a gross sum, to their destination, or
to the end of his line, as if he employed
his own locomotive and cars, or a steamboat, and ra a separate train or steamer,
for the accommodation of his own basiness, as must be soon done, upon some
routes, if the express business continoes to increase as heretofore. It seems
to us, that throwing the responsibility
of the conduct of all the agencies,
in the transportation, upon the owner
of the goods is virtually reducing express carriers to the position of mere
forwarders, and agents for the transportation, bound to see the goods put
upon the trains or boats, and to oversee
them during the transit. But the court
charged the jury in the principal ease,
that these companies were responsible as
common carriers, which is now the almost universal rule, applied to such companies to the extent of their own lines.
If that be so, the fact that the consignor
understood, or might have so understood,
if he had reflected or inquired, that the
express companies would be compelled
to employ the agency or assistance of
the railway companies in the transportation, is of no importance whatever in
determining the question, upon whom
rested the responsibility for the conduct
of such companies ; or rather it has no
tendency to show that the express company was not responsible, but the contrary. The question is, not who controlled these agencies, but who employed
and paid them? And there can he bit
one answer to such an inquiry. It was
the express company and that alone.
How then can it be claimed, with any
plausibility, that an agency employed
and paid by the express company, and
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to do the work of the company, which
they have contracted to do, and been paid
for doing, is not the agency of the carrier, but of the owner of the goods ?
It seems to be considered by the learned
judges that the gxception in the bill
of lading of responsibility for loss by
fire possesses some peculiar characteribties, whereby the carrier becomes some
other kind of a bailee, so far as loss by fire
is concerned. But there can be nothing
in this which tends to excuse the defendants in this case. They are still
carriers, but not responsible for loss by
fire occurring without the fault of the carrier, his servants, agents or employees.
This is a condition of the exemption
from responsibility which the law implies, notwithstanding the terms of the
exemption are general. The exemption
in full is that the carrier shall not be
held responsible for loss by fire octrring without any improper cotduct oil
the part of any- of the agencies of the
transportation. And for this purpose
the carrier is identified with the conduct
of thlose employed by him in this service.
This agency may be called an employee
or a sub-contractor. It is not material
by what name, or whether the carrier
had control of the agency. The contractor for any work who gives it, or a

portion of it, into the hands of a subcontractor to be done, will have no control over the servants or the conduct of
the sub-contractor, but he will, none the
less, be responsible to the party with
whom he made the primary contract for
the conduct of the work by all his subcontractors, whether servants or subcontractors, as much as for that of his
immediate servants. The passenger who
is injured by cause of a collision between
the train carrving him and one in the
opposite direction, owned by another
company, through the fault of both
trains, cannot recover because he is
affected by the conduct of his train, although having no control over it and not
in fault himself, because he is identified
with the conduct of the company carrying him under the ordinary conduct of
passenger transportation. Thoroughgood
v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115; Catlin v. Hills,
Id. 123. And the rule must be the same
where freight is carried upon a railway,
whether the person employing the company to make the transportation own tfe
freight or has assumed the transportation
by contract; in either case the carrier
will be responsible for the conduct of
the agency employed by him.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of the United State8.
WALTER D. SPROTT v. THE UNITED STATES.
A purchaser of cotton from the Confederate States, who knew that the money
he paid for it went to sustain the rebellion, cannot in the Court of Claims recover
the proceeds, when it has been captured and sold, under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act.
The moral turpitude of the transaction forbids that in a court of law he should
be permitted to establish his title by proof of such a transaction.
The acts of the states in rebellion, in the ordinary course of administration of
law, must be upheld in the interest of civil society, to which such a government
was a hecessity.
But the government of the Confederacy had no existence except as an organized treason. Its purpose while it lasted was to overthrow the Intul government
and its statutes, its decrees, its authority can give no validity to any act done in,
its service or in aid of its purpose.
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Tins was an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Claims against.
the appellant rejecting his claim to the proceeds of the sale of cotton
under the act in regard to captured and abandoned property. That
court made the fillowing fiudin- ofl fts and conclusions of law
I. At different times during the years 1864 and 1865, large quantities
of cotton were purchased by the agents of the Confederate States for the
treasonable purpose of maintaining the war of the rebellion against the
government of the United States. Of cotton thus purchased by various
agents in Claiborne county, Mississippi, three hundred bales were sold
to the claimant by one agent, in March 1865, for ten cents a pound, in
the currency of the United States. The sale was made by the agent as
of cotton belonging to the Confederate States, and it was understood by
the claimant at the time of the purchase to be the property of the rebel
government, and was purchased as such. The agent had been specially
instructed by the Confederate government " to sell any and all cotton
he could for the purpose of raising money to purchase munitions of
war, and supplies for the Confederate army ;" but the purpose of the
sale was not disclosed to the claimant, whose purpose was not to aid
the Confederate States, buying the cotton at its market value and
regarding it as a mere business transaction of " cotton for cash."
The
cotton was delivered to him at the time the money was paid, he then
being a resident of Claiborne county, within the Confederate lines.
II. The cotton was captured in 'May 1865, and the proceeds of some
portion thereof are in the treasury. And the Court of Claims, upon the
foregoing facts, decided as conclusions of law1. The government of the Confederate States was an unlawful assemblage without corporate power to take, hold or convey a valid title to
property, real or personal.
2. The claimant was chargeable with notice of the treasonable intent
of the sale by the Confederate government, and the transaction was
forbidden by the laws of the United States, and wholly void, so that
claimant acquired no title to the property which is the subject of suit.
Geo. Taylor and R.

1t. Corwine, for appellant.

The Atty.-General, for the United State8.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-We do not think it necessary to say anything in rbgard
to the first proposition of law laid down by the Court of Claims. Whether
the temporary government of the Confederate States had the capacity to
take and hold title to real or personal property, and how far it is to be
recognised as having been a defacto government, and if so, what conse,itetices follow in regard to its transactions as they are to be viewed in
a e,,nrt of the United States, it will be time enough for us to decide
woci, such decision becomes necessary. There is no such necessity in
the present case. We rest our affirmance of' the judgment of the Court
of Claims upon its second proposition.
It is a fact so well known as to need no finding of the court to establish it, a fict which, like many other historical events, all courts take
notice of, that cotton was the principal support of the rebellion, so far as
pecuniary aid was necessary to its support. The Confederate government early adopted the policy of collecting large quantities of cotton
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under its control, either by exchanging its bonds for the cotton, or when
that failed, by forced contributions. So long as the imperfect blockade
of the Southern ports and the unguarded condition of the Mexican
frontier enabled them to export this cotton, they were well supplied in
return with arms, ammunition, medicine, and the necessaries of life not
grown within their lines, as well as with that other great sinew of war.
gold. If the rebel government could freely have exchanged the cottiu
of which it was enabled to possess itself, for the munitions of war or fior
gold, it seems very doubtful if it could have been suppressed. So whei
the rigor of the blockade prevented successful export of this cotton,
their next resource was to sell it among their own people, or to such persons claiming outwardly to be loyal to the United States, as would buy
of them, for the money necessary to support the tottering fabric of
rebellion which they called a government.
The cotton which is the subject of this controversy was of this class.
It had been in the possession and under the control of the Confederate
government, with claim of title. It was captured during the last days
of that government by our forces, and sold by the officers appointed
for that purpose, and the money deposited in the treasury.
The claimant now asserts a right to this money on the ground that he
was the owner of the cotton when it was so captured. This claim of
right or ownership he must prove in the Court of Claims. He attempts
to do so b~y showing that he purchased it of the Confederate government
and paid them for it in money. In doing this lie gave aid and assistance
to the rebellion in the most efficient manner he possibly could. He
could not have aided that cause more acceptably if he had entered its
service and become a blockade-runner, or under the guise of a privateer
had preyed upon the unoffending commerce of his country. It is asking too much of a court of law sitting under the authority of the
government then struggling for existence against a treason respectable
only for the numbers and the force by which it was supported, to hold
that one of its-own citizens, owing and acknowledging to it allegiance,
can by the proof of such a transaction establish a title to the property
so obtained. The proposition that there is in many cases a public policy
which forbids courts of justice to allow any validity to contracts because
of their tendency to affect injuriously the highest public interests, and
to undermine or destroy the safeguards of the social fabric, is too well
settled to admit of dispute. That any person owing allegiance to an
organized government, can make a contract by which, for the sake of
gain, he contributes most substantially and knowingly to the vital
necessities of a treasonable conspiracy against its existence, and then in
a court of that government base successfully his rights on such a transaction, is opposed to all that we have learned of the invalidity of immoral contracts. A clearer case of turpitude in the consideration of a
contract can hardly be imagined unless treason be taken out of the
catalogue of crimes.
The case is not relieved of its harsh features by the finding of the
court that the claimant did not intend to aid the rebellion, but only to
make money. It might as well be said that the man who would sell for
a sum far beyond its value to a lunatic, a weapon with which he knew
the latter would kill himself, only intended to make money and did not
intend to aid the lunatic in his fatal purpose. This court, in Ilanauer v.
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Doane, 12 Wall. 342, speaking of one who set up the same defence,
says: " He voluntarily aids treason. lie cannot be permitted to stand
on the nice metaphysical distinction that, although he knows that the
purchaser buys the goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does
not sell them for that purpose. The consequences of his acts are too
serious to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend the consequendes of his own voluntary act." This case, and the succeeding
one of Jranauer v. Woodrqff, 15 Wall. 349, are directly in point in
bbupport of our view of the ease before us.
The recognition of the existence and the validity of the acts of the
so-called Confederate government, and that of the states which yielded
a temporary support to that government, stand on very different grounds,
and are governed by very different considerations.
The latter, in most, if not in all, instances, merely transferred the
existing state organizations to the support of a new and different
national head. The same constitutions, the same laws for the protection
of property and personal rights remained, and were administered by the
same officers. These laws, necessary in their recognition and administration to the existence of organized society, were the same, with slight
exceptions, whether the authorities of the state acknowledged allegiance
to the true or the false federal power. They were the fundamental principles for which civil society is organized into government in all countries,
and must be respected in their administration under whatever temporary
dominant authority they may be exercised. It is only when in the use
of these powers substantial aid and comfort was given or intended to be
given to the rebellion, when the functions necessarily reposed in the state
for the maintenance of civil society were perverted to the manifest and
intentional aid of treason against the government of the Union, that
their acts are void: Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.
The government of the Confederate States can receive no aid from
this course (i' reasoning. It had no existence, except as a conspiracy to
overthrow lawful authority. Its foundation was treason against the
existing Federal government. Its single purpose, so long as it lasted, was
to make that treason successful. So far from being necessary to the
organization of civil government,.or to its maintenance and support, it
was inimical to social order, destructive of the best interests of society,
and its primary object was to overthrow the government on which these
so largely depended. Its existence and temporary power wore an enormous evil. which the whole force of the government and the people of
the United States was engaged for years in destroying.
When it was overthrown it perished totally. It left no laws, no
statutes, no decrees, no authority which can give support to any contract.
or any act done in its service, or in aid of its purpose, or which contributed to protract its existence. So far as the actual exercise of its
physical power was brought to bear upon individuals, that may, undeT
some circumstances, constitute a justification or excuse for acts otherwise indetensible, but no validity can be given in the courts of this
country to acts voluntarily performed in direct aid and support of its
unlawful purpose. What of good or evil has flowed from it remains for
the consideration and discussion of the philosophical statesman and
historian. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.
CLIFF'ORD, J.-L concur in the judgment of the court solely upon
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the ground that the purchase of the cotton and the payment of the consideration necessarily tended to give aid to the rebellion, awl' that all
such contracts are void, as contrary to public policy. All such portions
of the opinion as enforce that view have my concurrence, but I dissent
from the residue of it as unnecessary to the conclusion.
DAVIS, J.-I concur in the.judgment in this case on the ground.,
stated by Mr. Justice CLIFFORD.
FIELD, J.-I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court
in this case, and from the reasons stated in the opinion upon which that
judgment is founded. The opinion appears to me to proceed upon the
assumption that this is an action to enforce a contract which was illegal in
its inception, and, therefore: without standing in a court of justice. And
the cases of Hanauerv. Doane, in the 12th of Wallace, and If1untmer v.
TWoodruff, in the 15th of Wallace, are cited in support of the position that contracts of this character will not be upheld. Those authorities do establish the position that contracts entered into for the
purpose of aiding.the late insurrectionary government are illegal and
void, and will not be enforced by the Federal tribunals. In the first ease
the action was upon two promissory notes, the consideration of which
consisted in part of stores and supplies furnished the defendant, an army
contractor of the Confederate government, with knowledge that they were
to be used in aid of the rebellion, and in part of due-bills issued by the
contractor to other parties for similar supplies, and taken up at his request; and the court held that the sale of the goods, being made with
the vendor's knowledge of the uses to which they were to be applied,
was an illegal transaction and did not constitute a valid consideration
for the note of the purchaser, and that the due-bills given by him for
similar goods, being taken up by third parties with knowledge of the
purpose for which they were issued, were equally invalid as a consideration for his note in their hands. In the second case the action was upon
a promissory note, the only consideration of which consisted of certain
bonds, issued by the convention of Arkansas which attempted to carry
that state out of the Union, and issued for the purpose of supporting the
war against the Federal government, and styled " war bonds" on their
face, and one of the questions presented for our determination was
whether the consideration was illegal under the Constitution and laws
of the United States. And the court answered that it did not admit of
a doubt that the consideration was thus illegal-and void ; that "if the
-Constitution be, as it declares on its face it is, the supreme law of the
land, a contract or undertaking of any kind to destroy or impair its supremacy, or to aid or encourage any attempt to that end, must necessarily
be unlawful and can never be treated, in a court sitting under that Constitution and exercising authority by virtue of its provisions, as a meritorious consideration for the promise of any one."
In both of these cases the aid of the courts was sought to enforce unexecuted contracts which were illegal and void in their inception, because
made in aid of the rebellion, and all that they decide is that contracts
of that character can never be enforced in the courts of that government
against which the rebellion was raised. In those courts such contracts
stand on the same footing as other illegal transactions ; they will not be
upheld nor enforced. In those decisions I concurred, and in the second I
wrote the opinion. I adhere to the views expressed in both cases.
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But, with great respect for my associates, I am compelled to say that,
in my judgment, neither of those cases has any just application to the
case at bar, or to any question properly involved in its decision. This

action is not brought to enforce an unexecuted contract, legal or illegal:
there is no question of enforcing a contract in the case. The question,
and the only question, is whether the cotton seized by the forces of the
United States in May 1865, was at the time the property of the clainant. If it was his property, then he is entitled to its proceeds, and the
judgment of the Court of Claims should be reversed; and in determining this question we are not concerned with the consideration of his
loyalty or disloyalty. He was a citizen of Mississippi and resided within
the lines of th Confederacy, and the act forbi'dding intercourse with the
enemy does not apply to his case. He was subject to be treated, in common with other citizens of the Confederacy, as a public enemy during
the continuance of the war. And if he were disloyal in fact, and if by
his purchase of the cotton he gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, as
this court adjudges, the impediment which such conduct previously
interposed to the prosecution of his claim was removed by the proclamation of pardon and amnesty made by the President on the 25th day of
December 1868. Ie was included within the ternis of that beneficent
public act of the Chief Magistrate of the United States, as fully as if
he had been specifically named therein. That pardon and anesty did
not, of course, and not could change the actual fact of previous disloyalty,
if it existed, but, as was said in Carlisle v. The United States, 16 Wallace 151, "they for ever close the eyes of the court to the perception of
that fact as an element in its judgment, no rights of third parties having
intervened."
In legal contemplation the executive pardon not merely
releases an offender from punishment, but obliterates the offence itself.
In the present case, therefore, the question of the loyalty or disloyalty
of the claimant is withdrawn from our consideration; and as the nonintercourse act does not apply to his case, it does not concern the United
States whether he acquired the property from another public enemy or
from one of the states of the Confederacy, or from an agent of the Confederate government.
le was in possession of the property at the time
of the seizure, asserting ownership to it; and no one then disputed, and
no one since has disputed his title. Who then owned the property if he
did not? The United States did not own it. They did not acquire by
its seizure any title to the property. They have never asserted any
greater rights arising fromn capture of property on land in the hands of
citizens engaged in the rebellion than those which one belligerent nation
asserts with reference to such property captured by it belonging to the
citizens or subjects of the other belligerent. All public property which
is movable in its nature, possessed by one belligerent, and employed onl
land in actual hostilities, passes by capture. But private property on
land, except such as becomes booty when taken from enemies in the
field or lesiegcd towns, or is levied as a military contribution upon the
inhabitants of' the hostile territory, is exempt fron confiscation by the
general law of nations. Such is the language of Mr. Wheaton, an authority on all questions of public law. " And this exemption," he adds,
'" extends even to the case of an absolute and unqualified conquest of
the enemies' country :" Lav of Nations, Lawrence's ed., 596.
In Browa v. The United States, 8 Crandh 192, the question arose
whether enemy's property found on land at the commencement of hos-
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tilities with Great Britain, in 1812, could be seized and condemned as
a necessary consequence of the declaration of war; and the court held
that it could not be thus condemned without an Act of Congress authoriting its confiscation. The court, speaking through Chief'Justice MARS1..LL, said that it was conced-d tblit war. gives to the sovereign full
right to take the persons aid .caifiscave th,. prof.cr.-y of" te '3pcmy
wherever found, and that the mitigations of this r;gid rule, whi(h the
humane and wise policy of modern tapcs has introduced into practice,
miiht more or less affect the exere:s? of this righlt btt c.t'wI not impair
the right itself. I-That remains undiminished, and vlhen he sovereign
authority shall choose to bring it into operation, the judicial department
must give effect to its will." " But until that will shall be expressed, no
power of condemnation can exist in the court."
It may be doubted whether the right to confiscate property of the
enemy wherever found, here stated to have been conceded, would at this
day be admitted without some qualification excepting private property
on land not engaged in actual hostilities or taken as booty, or levied as
a military contribution. Be that as it may, the decision is emphatic
that until Congress by some legislative act directs the confiscation of
private property on land, none can be ordered by the courts.
Now, Congress has only provided for the confiscation of private property of persons engaged in the rebellion, by the Act of August 6th
1861, 12 Stat. at Large 319, and that of July 17th 1862, Id. 589.
Both of these acts require legal proceedings resulting in a judicial
decree of condemnation before the title of the owner can be divpsted.
The present case is not brought under either of these acts. No proceedings for the condemnation aud forfeiture of the cotton seized, or of
its proceeds, have ever been instituted by the government. The title
of the claimant remains, therefore, at this day, as perfect as it did on
the day the cotton was seized.
In the case of The United States v. Klekin, 13 Wall. 136, this court
had occasion to consider the rights of property, as affected by the war,
in the hands of citizens engaged in hostilities against the United States,
and it held, after mature consideration, that the effect of the Act of
Congress of March 12th 1863, to provide fbr the collection of captured
and abandoned property in insurrectionary districts, under which the
present action is brought, is not to confiscate, or in any case absolutely
divest, the property of the original owner, even though disloyal, and
that by the seizure the government constituted itself a trustee fbr those
who were by that act declared entitled, or might thereafter be recognised
as entitled to the proceeds.
But it is contended that the Confederate government, being unlawful
in its origin and continuance, was incapable of acquiring holding, or
transferring a valid title to the property. The court below so held in
terms, and this court so far sustains that ruling as to declare that the
claimant could not acquire any title to the cotton seized, by purchase
from that government.
Assuming that the Confederate government was thus incapable of acquiring or transferring title to property, the result claimed by the
Attorney-General, and held by the nm:jority of this court, would not,.
in my judgiuent, fbllow. That organization, whatever its character,
acted through agents. Tlose agents purchased and sold property..
VOL. XXIII.-7
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The title of the vendors passed to somhody; if it did not vest in tle
Condederate government, because that organization was incapable of
taking the property, it remained witfi the agents. Tihe sale of the vendors
was a release and quit-claiin of their interest, and when that took place
the property was not derelict and abandoned. Whatever title existed
to (he prouarty was, thcrefoe,, in the agent? if their assumed principal
had nro #oistence, and by their sale passed to purchasers from them.
'Undoubtedly larceny could be al!e,-ed against one who feloniously took
the property Fra.),
st'el purchaser. The taker would not be allowed iIt
any court w hic. administers justice to escape punishment by showing
that no title passed to the purchaser because his vendor was the agent, or
assumed to be the agent, of a government which had no legal existence.
And it is equally clear that the purchaser could have maintained an
action for injuries to the property thus purchased, or for its recovery if
forcibly removed from his possession by a third party. The plea that
the property was not his because obtained from the agent, or a person
assuming to be the agent, of an unlawful political organization, would
not be held a justification for the injuries or the detention.
But I do not desire to place my objection to the decision of the court
upon this view of the case. I place it on higher ground, one which is
recognised by all writers on international law, from Grotius, its father,
to Wheaton and Phillimore, its latest expounders, and that is, that a
-government de facto has, during its continuance, the same right within
its territorial limits to acquire and to dispose of movable personal
property. which a government de jure possesses. And that the Con,federate government, whatever its character in other respects, possessed
-supreme power over a large extent of territory, embracing several states
-and a population of many millions, and exercised that power for nearly
four years, we are all compelled to admit. As stated by this court, speak.ing through Mr. Justice NELSON, Mamf n v. Insurance Co., 6 Wall.
-14, it cannot be denied that, by the use of unlawful and unconstitutional
means, "a government in fact was erected greater in territory than many
of the old governments in Europe, complete in the organization of all
its parts, containing within its limits more than eleven millions of
-people. and of sufficient resources in men and money to carry on a civil
-war of unexampled dimensions; and during all which time the exercise
of many belligerent rights were either conceded to it, or were acquiesced
in by the supreme government, such as the treatment of captives both
on land and sea as prisoners of war; the exchange of prisoners; their
vessels captured recognised as prizes of war and dealt with accordingly;
their property seized on land referred to the judicial tribunals for
adjudication; their ports blockaded, and the blockade maintained by a
-suitable force, and duly notified to neutral powers, the same as in open
and public war."
In T7orington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 10, this court placed the Confederate government among that class of governments de teto of which
the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico were examples, and
said, speaking through Chief Justice CHASE, that " to the extent of
actual supremacy, however unlawfully gained, in all matters of government within its military lines the power of the insurgent government
cannot be questioned. That supremacy did not justify acts of hostility
to the United States. How far it should. txcuse them must be left to
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the lawful government upon the re-establishment of its authnrity. But
it made obedience to its authority in civil and local matters not only a necessity. but a duty. Without such obedience civil order was impossible."
With these authorities before me I should unhesitatingly have saidbut for the fact that a majority of my associates differ from me, and the
presumption is that they are right and I am wroig,-that it was impossible for any court to come to the conclusion that a government thus
organized, having such immense resources and exercising actual supremacy over such vast territory and millions of people, did not possess the
power to acquire and to transfer the title to personal property within its
territorial limits.
Our government in its efforts to reach the property or the extinct Confederacy has asserted a very different doctrine from that announced in
the court below, and so far as the cotton seized in this case is concerned,
approved here. It has alleged in the courts of England that that Confederacy did acquire property to a vast amount and attempted to reach
it in the hands of its agents. In United States v. McRae, 8 Law Reports, Equity 69, it filed a bill in the court of chancery in England to
obtain an account of all moneys and goods which came to the hands of
the defendant, as agent or otherwise, on behalf of the Confederate
government during the insurrection, and the payment of the moneys
-which, on taking such account, might be in his hands, and a delivery
over of the goods in his possession. The bill alleged that the Confederate government possessed itself of divers moneys, goods and treasure,
part of the public property of the United States, and that other moneys
and goods were from time to time paid and contributed to it by divers
persons, inhabitants of the United States, or were seized and acquired
by that government in the exercise of its usurped authority; that it had
sent to agents and other persons in England large amounts of money to
be laid out in purchasing goods for its use, and had sent there large
quantities of goods to be sold; that it had thus sent large sums of money
and large quantities of goods to the defendant, and that on the dissolution of that government he had them in his possession. And the bill
claimed that all the joint or public property of the person constituting
the Confederate government, including the said moneys and goods, had
vested in the United States and constituted their absolute property, and
ought to be paid and delivered to them. The court held that the
moneys, goods and treasure which were at the outbreak of the rebellion
the public property of the United States, and which were seized by the
rebels, still continued their moneys, goods and treasure, their rights of
property and rights of possession being in no wise divested or defeated
by the wrongful seizure. But that with respect to property which had
been voluntarily contributed to or acquired by the insurrectionary government, and impressed in its hands with the character of public property, the right of the United States was that of a successor of the Confederate government, and it could only recover such property from an
agent of that government to the same extent, and subject to the same
rights and obligations, as if the insurrectionary government had not
been overthrown.
In the case of The United States v. Prioleau, 2 Hemming & Miller's
Chancery Cases 559, the sante court again held that the government of
the United States could recover the property of the Confederate government, as its successor or representative, in the hands of its agents, but

